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ABSTRACT
This study aimed to identify the relationship between the Structural Liquidity Index (SLI) and macroeconomic variables, 
bank characteristics, and the validity period of the Basel III Agreement. Although the academic discussion on bank liquidity 
essentially addresses short-term issues, monitoring long-term liquidity helps assess any excessive dependency of banks on 
unstable resources, thus contributing to mitigating the risks of systemic liquidity crises such as that of 2008. As it provides 
evidence of the relationship between the SLI and the selected explanatory variables, the study can be included in the context 
of the discussions involving the Basel III Agreement, which establishes the implementation of the long-term liquidity index 
regulatory requirement as of 2018. The model was formulated based on fourteen research hypotheses, tested using panel data 
regressions estimated via pooled ordinary least squares, least squares with fixed effects, and two-stage least squares with fixed 
effects. The dependent variable was constructed based on the accounting data of 184 conglomerates and individual financial 
institutions operating in the country between June 2002 and December 2014. The SLI presented a positive relationship with 
changes in the exchange rate, international reserves, and reserve requirements, as well as with the profitability, size, and main 
specialization of the institution. On the other hand, we found a negative relationship between the SLI and the basic interest 
rate, country risk, balance of trade, validity period of the Basel III Agreement, type of equity control (private vs. government), 
and the bank being publicly listed on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa) or privately 
held. The validation of the relationships between these explanatory variables and the SLI provides a broader understanding 
of the risks to which financial institutions are exposed, contributing to the preventive analysis of bank liquidity risk – an 
antecedent indicator of financial crises, diminished confidence, and economic instability.
Keywords: structural liquidity, banking institutions, Basel III, banks, liquidity risk.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to identify the relationship 
between the structural liquidity of the banking institutions 
that carry out their activities in the Brazilian market and 
macroeconomic variables, the individual characteristics 
of the institutions, and sensitivity to the validity period 
of the Basel III Agreement.
According to Krishnamurthy, Bai, and Weymuller 
(2016), bank liquidity performs an important role during 
financial crises. For example, as a result of the most recent 
global financial crisis, government guarantees to the 
biggest European banks exceeded € 1.4 trillion. During 
the same period, in the United States, the injection of 
resources into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac alone totaled 
US$ 200 billion. Issues such as these have drawn attention 
to the need to discuss more objectively the liquidity of 
financial institutions (Borça & Torres, 2008; Cardoso, 
2013; Flannery & Giacomini, 2015).
It was due to recognizing the important role of 
liquidity in the 2008 crisis that the Basel Committee 
introduced, in 2009, the liquidity regulation for 
commercial banks (Krishnamurthy et al. 2016). At the 
time, a series of proposals were announced to strengthen 
the banking structure, known as the Basel III Agreement: 
(i) reinforcement of the global capital framework; (ii) 
introduction of a leverage index; (iii) minimum capital 
requirements; and (iv) different treatment for large 
institutions that are relevant to the global financial system, 
also known as “too big to fail”.  
The Basel III Agreement defined two new liquidity 
requirements: the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and 
the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), with two distinct, 
but complementary objectives. The LCR contemplates 
liquidity questions of a short-term nature, while the NSFR 
addresses the same aspects, but from a medium and long-
term standpoint (Cardoso, 2013).
According to Bonfin and Kim (2012), these measures 
aim to prevent banks from being excessively dependant on 
short-term loans, since the systemic risk would inevitably 
increase if many banks adopted this strategy. Thus, the 
indicators proposed in Basel III aim to expand the scope 
of liquidity risk assessments in the banking system.
As part of the bank supervision and liquidity risk 
monitoring process, the Brazilian Central Bank (CB) 
publishes the liquidity index (LI), equivalent to the LCR, 
aggregated for the whole banking system, and it simulates 
a stress scenario with a 30-day timeframe (Tabak, Guerra, 
Miranda & Souza, 2012). The CB has also developed the 
structural liquidity index (SLI) to assess the continuity and 
viability of banking activities, incorporating the objectives 
of the NSFR. These indicators were added to the Brazilian 
regulations, requiring minimum compliance as of 2016 
for the LI (LCR) and as for 2018 for the SLI (NSFR).
Within academia, the debate regarding bank liquidity 
has mainly taken place via studies such as those by Aspachs, 
Nier, and Tiesset (2005), Oreiro (2005), Gonçalves and 
Braga (2008), Silva (2009), Vodova (2011a, 2011b), Tabak 
et al. (2012), Malik and Rafique (2013), Vinhado and 
Belém (2013), Vasconcelos (2014), and Moussa (2015). 
Although these studies reveal various aspects related 
to bank liquidity, they essentially address short-term 
liquidity. In regard to long-term structural liquidity, the 
object of this study, the discussions are much more in 
their infancy.
The need to observe the influence of the economic 
environment over bank liquidity is demonstrated by the 
fact that the Brazilian Central Bank (CB, 2015) simulates 
“extreme and adverse changes in the main economic and 
financial variables”, called capital stress tests, with the 
purpose of “measuring resistance, as well as the capacity 
to absorb losses caused by any materialization of the 
main risks to which the banking system is exposed”. For 
Tabak et al. (2012), liquidity stress tests are very useful 
for assessing whether banks present specific liquidity 
weaknesses. 
Gonzales-Hermosillo (1999), for example, suggests 
that macroeconomic variables can capture the factors 
that weaken banks, while Aita (2010) considers 
studies that identify the macro- and microeconomic 
factors that affect financial institutions to be relevant, 
in order to avoid crises of confidence and economic 
imbalances. In regard to this aspect, Tirole (2011) states 
that macroeconomic questions are fundamental for 
institutions and for providing liquidity and they should 
be considered in systemic risk models.
Thus, in the literature on the banking sector, the niche 
of this study is structural liquidity, which has a different 
focus in relation to short-term liquidity, since it refers 
to the management of resources in order to support 
long-term lending operations. The study differs from 
previous studies by investigating, using an econometric 
model, whether macroeconomic and regulatory variables 
and the individual characteristics of banks can affect 
their structural liquidity. In a wider sense, by identifying 
empirical evidence regarding which variables affect the 
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structural liquidity of banks, this study contributes to 
the development of the literature with respect to aspects 
that can influence the health of the banking system and 
lending in the real economy.
Based on the relationships suggested by the literature, 
panel data regressions were estimated using the pooled 
least squares method, testing a model formulated based 
on 14 hypotheses concerning the relationship between the 
variables of interest and structural liquidity, a dependent 
variable constructed based on the accounting data of 184 
banking institutions and conglomerates operating in Brazil 
between June 2002 and December 2014.
The use of these variables broadens the understanding 
of the risks to which the institutions are exposed, in order 
to assess any excessive dependency of the banks on unstable 
resources, contributing to the preventative analysis of bank 
liquidity risk – an antecedent indicator of financial crises, 
diminished confidence, and economic imbalances.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
By means of financial intermediation, banks provide 
the liquidity that makes investment and consumption 
possible, by guaranteeing resources for investors and 
consumers. According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
in a financial system where there is confidence, the risks 
are shared among agents. However, suspicion about the 
possibility of a bank failing can cause a bank run by 
depositors to withdraw their deposits, including those 
who would prefer to maintain them if they were not 
worried. In this scenario, the bank is obliged to liquidate 
its assets, even at a loss, and even if not all depositors 
withdraw their funds. In other words, the same deposits 
that enable banks to provide liquidity to the real economy 
are those that leave them vulnerable to bank runs caused 
by a crisis of confidence.
Bank runs are the most common characteristic of 
the extreme crises that have played a leading role in 
monetary history. They cause real economic problems 
because even healthy banks can fail, interrupting loans 
and paralyzing productive investments. Bank runs are 
costly and reduce social well-being by interrupting 
production and destroying optimal risk-sharing among 
depositors, thus causing economic problems (Diamond 
& Dybvig, 1983).
As they are exposed to various related risks, the 
complexity of banks has grown over time (Bonfin & Kim, 
2012; Cardoso, 2013). According to Cardoso (2013), 
they have taken on greater responsibility with third-
party resources, given the greater representativeness 
in comparison to own capital. Banks capture resources 
with lower maturities than those with which they grant 
credit and, in this time gap, they can incur liquidity risk, 
which is characterized by insufficient resources to honor 
commitments (Gonçalves & Braga, 2008). 
Financial crises, as Capelletto (2006) warns, cause 
imbalances in the economy. Initially in the United States, 
but subsequently spreading to other countries, there was 
a loss of market confidence in the solvency and liquidity 
of many banks during the worst point of the 2008 crisis, 
which quickly spread to the rest of the system and to the 
real economy, resulting in a contraction of liquidity and 
credit. Finally, the public sector intervened by providing 
liquidity, capital, and guarantees, exposing tax payers 
to considerable losses (Gideon, Petersen, Mukuddem-
Petersen & Hlatshwayo, 2013).
2.1. Liquidity Risk and the Basel Agreements
According to Resolution n. 4,090/2012 of the National 
Monetary Council (Brazilian Central Bank – CB, 2012), 
liquidity risk is defined as the possibility of a financial 
institution not being able to “efficiently honor its expected 
and unexpected current and future obligations” or “to 
trade the market price of a position, due to its large size 
in relation to the volume normally traded or as a result 
of some discontinuity in the market”. 
According to Mishkin and Eakins (2012), defaults in 
the subprime mortgage market overwhelmed the market 
in 2008, leading to the worst financial crisis in the United 
States since the great depression. This crisis left behind 
various lessons, one of the most important being the 
need to establish regulations for liquidity risk (Bonfin 
& Kim, 2012).
This incentivized an overhaul of Basel II and the 
introduction of new propositions that resulted in the 
Basel III Agreement. For Cardoso (2013), this agreement 
incentivizes more prudence and transparency in bank 
fund-raising operations, by means of instruments that 
provide a lower risk propensity and stimulate leveraging. It 
also introduces a reflection of the impact of systemic risk, 
which shows the need for more substantive supervision 
by requiring institutions to present better quality indices, 
enabling microprudential supervision to be complemented 
by macroprudential supervision.
The new regulation establishes two liquidity 
indicators that will be internationally required from 
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financial institutions: the LCR, which indicates the 
level of short-term liquidity, already incorporated into 
the rules of Brazil as of October 2015 for institutions 
with total assets greater than R$ 100 billion; and the 
NSFR, which refers to structural liquidity and which, 
according to an agreement between the G20 countries, 
will be implemented as of 2018. The NSFR is a long-
term structural ratio that objectifies avoiding liquidity 
imbalances and incentivizing banks to use stable sources 
to finance their activities. 
From a bank supervision perspective, these indicators 
enable liquidity to be monitored and the consistency 
of cross-inspection to improve, helping supervisors to 
identify and assess trends in bank liquidity risk and 
anticipate systemic risks (Gideon et al. 2013).
Regarding the NSFR requirement, there are criticisms, 
the main ones being: (i) it may be very restrictive and 
harm banks’ liquidity and maturity transformation 
activities; (ii) it may make deposits less stable as banks 
compete for this scarce source of funding; (iii) it may 
incentivize the migration from maturity and liquidity 
transformation activities towards shadow banking; 
and (iv) it may significantly affect emerging and 
developing markets, which tend to have less developed 
capital markets and depend on long-term funding from 
banks (Gobat, Yanase & Maloney, 2014). In addition, 
maintaining liquidity and equity levels in accordance 
with the regulatory requirements generates costs that 
can have an impact on gross domestic product (GDP), 
in the short and medium-term, a reason for which 2018 
was defined as the deadline for implementation (Gideon 
et al. 2013).
Other consequences of implementing NSFR indicated 
by King (2013) may derive from different behavioral 
responses to the regulation involving liquidity. Thus, 
banks that are not able to reach the minimum stipulated 
requirement may opt to change the structure of their 
balance sheets and alter the composition or maturity of 
their loans or of their investments. But these strategies 
would have costs for the economy as a whole, configuring 
the trade-off between regulating liquidity, bank risk, and 
return, in addition to their being a lack of experience 
of liquidity regulation, which creates the potential for 
unintentional consequences (King, 2013).  
It is important to highlight the observation made 
by DeYoung and Jang (2016), that these liquidity and 
lending indices were not invented by the banking 
supervisors and regulators, since they are practiced by 
many banks in the United States as a way of diagnosing 
liquidity risks.
2.2. Bank Structural Liquidity
Structural liquidity is defined as managing the sources 
of funds so that they are stable enough to support longer-
term lending operations. This means that the greater the 
stability of the resources, the lower the risk of them being 
insufficient in the future (CB, 2015). In this sense, the CB, 
which had already developed the LI, incorporated into 
their monitoring the rationality introduced by the NSFR 
via the SLI within the regulatory framework of Basel III. 
The SLI has already been reported in aggregate form and 
without the CB opening up the data since 2015, via the 
Financial Stability Report (FSR), and it will be required 
of financial institutions as of 2018.
According to the CB (2015), the SLI is represented by 
the ratio between (i) “stable resources available”, composed 
of funds raised by the institution that it expects to maintain 
over a one-year timeframe (third-party resources) and its 
capital (own resources); and (ii) “stable resources needed”, 
formed of total assets, including off-balance sheet assets, 
with maturities greater than one year and/or with low 
liquidity. The calculation of the numerator and of the 
denominator is based on the sum of the balances of the 
liability (including equity) and asset accounts, respectively, 
after applying weighting factors that reflect the degree of 
collectability and liquidity of these components. Thus, an 
adequate funding structure for the type of business of the 
financial institution occurs when the SLI is equal to or 
greater than 1 (100%), in which case it is less susceptible 
to future liquidity problems (CB, 2015).
DeYoung and Jang (2016) explain that the main 
difference between the obligatory standards of Basel 
III and the reference liquidity indices used by banks 
in the United States (it is possible to link these with 
the SLI reported by the CB) is that the former, after its 
implementation, imposes a degree of liquidity linked to 
the bank’s level of lending. Thus, banks that have liquidity 
indices that are low or close to the minimum necessary 
will need to adopt measures so that the balance of their 
“liquidity buffers” complies with the new standards 
required by Basel III.
2.3. Development of the Research Hypotheses
Given that the purpose of the study is to identify the 
relationship between the structural liquidity of financial 
institutions in Brazil and macroeconomic variables, the 
characteristics of the institutions, and sensitivity to the 
implementation of Basel III, 14 research hypotheses 
were formulated based on the relationships suggested 
in the literature. The explanatory power of these variables 
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provides a broader understanding of the risks to which 
the financial institutions are exposed.
Keynes’ Liquidity Preference Theory states that 
banks favor return over liquidity when expectations 
are optimistic regarding an uncertain future; that is, the 
strategies of banks consider the trade-off between return 
and liquidity (Paula, 1998; Paula & Lima, 1999). This effect 
supports the findings of Dantas, Medeiros, and Capelletto 
(2011) and those of Primo, Dantas, Medeiros, and 
Capelletto (2013), who, when examining the determinants 
of ex-post bank spread and return, respectively, verified 
a positive relationship between economic activity and 
bank profitability.
In studies on bank liquidity, Aspachs et al. (2005), 
Vodova (2011a), and Vinhado and Belém (2013) declared 
that GDP growth is negatively related with liquidity 
levels. That is, banks maintain lower liquidity levels in 
periods of accelerated growth; in contrast, they build up 
their liquidity buffers during economic recessions. This 
assumption gives rise to the first research hypothesis:
H1: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
negatively related with the level of economic activity in the country.
According to Luporini and Alves (2010), the 
investment decisions of entrepreneurs are the result of 
an intertemporal choice between retaining universally 
liquid assets (currency) and creating specific liquidity 
assets (investment), comparing the interest rate and the 
expected return on investment, under conditions of 
uncertainty, the former being a form of reward for not 
choosing liquidity.
The results of Aspachs et al. (2005) suggested that in 
the United Kingdom the short-term interest rate appeared 
to affect liquidity buffers; that is, when the monetary 
authority tries to stimulate the economy by reducing the 
interest rate and correspondingly increasing the monetary 
base, there is a delay in the effects being transmitted, since 
the banks appear to maintain additional liquidity buffers 
on their balance sheets. 
Oreiro (2005) and Vinhado and Belém (2013) perceived 
a negative relationship between liquidity and the interest 
rate. In contrast, Silva (2009) and Vodova (2011a) found 
a positive relationship between the interest rate and bank 
liquidity and explain that this is due to the incentives to 
save more when interest rates rise, which increases bank 
liquidity – borrowers avoid more costly credit operations 
(which are most of banks’ long-term investments). Along 
the same lines, stable resources decrease, with the aim 
of taking advantage of short-term gains derived from 
the interest rate volatility. This reduction tends to be 
proportionally greater than the reduction in long-term 
investments. With this, it is inferred that:
H2: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
negatively related with the level of the interest rates.
Primo et al. (2013) identified a negative relationship 
between exchange rate variations and bank profitability, 
attributing this effect to the fact that banks are unable 
to adequately anticipate exchange rate variations, which 
negatively influences their performance. The authors 
highlight that exposure to exchange rate risk is limited 
to 30% of reference equity by regulatory determination.
Analyzing the relationship between exchange rate 
appreciation and bank insolvency, Aita (2010) found a 
positive relationship. Thus, based on the assumption that 
banks do not anticipate exchange rate variations and that 
the effect of these on liquidity depends on their exposure 
(which is limited), as well as on the results of previous 
research, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H3: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
positively related with variations in the exchange rate.
Country-risk is a type of external vulnerability 
measure that reflects aversion to the risk inherent to a 
particular economy. In the study by Manhiça and Jorge 
(2012) on bank spread, country-risk behavior indicated 
that when there is a deterioration in the country’s risk 
classification, there will be an increase in the interest rate 
margin practiced by banks. In a study on international 
liquidity, Resende and Amado (2007) state that Brazilian 
companies carry out their analyses (of their capacity to 
fulfill obligations) in accordance with their cash flows, 
while financial institutions verify both projected cash 
flow and the country’s vulnerability. Thus, the assumption 
will be tested that country-risk aversion would cause an 
outflow of foreign resources from Brazil towards countries 
that are considered as safer and this, consequently, would 
reduce the liquidity of Brazilian banks, even structural 
liquidity, giving support to the following hypothesis:
H4: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
negatively related with the Brazil-risk.
Aita (2010) found that a reduction in the balance of 
trade contributes to bank insolvency, considering that this 
is also caused by a lack of liquidity. In contrast, Resende 
and Amado (2007) found a strong and negative correlation 
between the international LI and Brazil’s current account 
balance of payments caused by the economy’s lack of 
competitiveness, low product diversification, and export 
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competitiveness on the international market. In other 
words, at times of economic growth, the balance of trade 
would tend to deteriorate due to the net inflow of resources 
into the balance of payments, which tends to stimulate 
the growth of stable resources more than proportionally 
to long-term investments. This context supports the 
following hypothesis:
H5: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
negatively related with the balance of trade. 
According to Resende and Amado (2007), increases 
in the international reserves of peripheral countries are 
exlained by expansions in the supply of international 
liquidity and by these economies absorbing international 
resources available for lending when there are facilities. 
In expansionary periods of the international liquidity 
cycles, the uncertainties in the peripheral economies 
are minimized, enabling an expansion of credit. Positive 
variations in the net inflow of foreign resources into 
the balance of payments expand the supply of credit, 
mitigating creditor countries’ preference for liquidity. 
This reasoning is inverted in contractionary phases of the 
international liquidity cycle, when international creditors 
increase their preference for liquidity, which materializes 
through the purchase of foreign assets, characterizing the 
movement known as capital flight. This is the basis for 
the next hypothesis:
H6: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
positively related with the level of international reserves in the 
economy.
The United States provides international liquidity 
as it is the biggest economy in the world. The decisions 
of resource providers to invest or not in the United 
States significantly affect the expansion of international 
liquidity; that is, the behavior of the American economy 
determines the level of international liquidity (Resende & 
Amado, 2007). In line with this understanding, changes 
in the American interest rates are also expected to affect 
international liquidity and, as a result, bank liquidity in 
Brazil. Thus, an increase in American interest rates can 
encourage more international capital to flow into that 
country, to the detriment of investments in developing 
and, therefore, more risky economies such as Brazil. 
Although this reasoning applies specifically to short-
term liquidity, not reflecting a measure of diminished 
confidence in the domestic economy, but of better 
conditions for the investor in the American economy, 
the following hypothesis is formulated:
H7: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
negatively related with American interest rates.
The funds that financial institutions are obliged to 
deposit at the CB, known as compulsory deposits, work as 
an economic policy mechanism. During the 2008 financial 
crisis, when a sharp retreat of liquidity occurred both 
in Brazil and abroad, compulsory deposits were used 
by the CB to mitigate these effects. Taking advantage of 
the significant volume of these deposits, the CB quickly 
made them available for the banking system, contributing 
to stabilizing the liquidity and supply of credit in the 
economy (CB, 2015).  
Compulsory deposits reduce the volume of resources 
available for voluntary investment by institutions (Dantas 
et al., 2011). This leads to the understanding that an 
increase in compulsory deposits inhibits banks’ long-term 
investments, since having scarcer resources directs them 
towards satisfying their short-term needs. As a result, the 
relationship with structural liquidity is positive, leading 
to the following hypothesis:
H8: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
positively related with the level of compulsory deposits in the 
economy.
When investigating the determinants of profitability, 
Rover, Tomazzia, and Fávero (2011) found a negative 
relationship between this and liquidity. According to the 
authors, at the same time as providing greater security, 
higher voluntary reserve values compromise profitable 
investments in loans and financing, which causes the 
negative relationship. The findings were compatible 
with the studies by Vodova (2011b), which focused on 
commercial banks in Slovakia, and by Moussa (2015), 
involving bank liquidity in Tunisia.
In the research by DeYoung and Jang (2016), the data 
suggest a positive relationship between liquidity and 
return in banks in the United States, with it being observed 
that financial returns [return on assets (ROA); return on 
equity (ROE)] followed an inverted U-shape in relation to 
the speeds of liquidity adjustments, with medium-sized 
banks operating very close to the sector’s profit, which 
maximizes the speed of adjustments. 
Based on these studies, the following hypothesis is 
formulated to be empirically tested:
H9: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
negatively related with the bank’s level of return.
DeYoung and Jang (2016) observed how banks in the 
United States reacted in the past (1992 to 2012) to liquidity 
shocks that made them deviate from their benchmarks for 
this indicator. The results showed that one in every seven 
common and medium-sized banks in the United States 
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were operating below the standard NSFR at the start of 
the financial crisis, with the breach rate increasing with 
the size of the bank. Analyzing the biggest institutions, 
more than half were unable to meet the standard NSFR 
simulated. Thus, it is inferred that, as banks increase in 
size, they establish lower liquidity targets, which results 
in the following hypothesis:
H10: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
negatively related with the size of the bank.
Vinhado and Belém (2013) found that Brazilian 
government banks presented a greater preference for 
liquidity in relation to private ones. The authors suggest 
that this possibly signals the fulfillment of the government 
role of these banks or their counter-cyclical position at 
some points in time, in order to irrigate the economy 
with liquidity to attenuate a recession by granting credit. 
Therefore, for this question, the following research 
hypothesis is tested:
H11: the structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil is 
positively related to whether the institution is under government 
control.
According to DeYoung and Jang (2016), although 
both the stock market and the debt market serve as 
external liquidity resources for banks, the stock market 
predominates. Based on this assumption, inserting a 
dichotomous variable into the model to identify the 
banks whose shares were traded on the stock exchange, 
the authors find a positive relationship between this 
characteristic and the liquidity of the banking institutions. 
This gives support to the following hypothesis:
H12: the level of structural liquidity of banking institutions in 
Brazil is positively related with whether they have shares publicly 
traded on the stock exchange.
It is possible that the structural liquidity of Brazilian 
banking institutions is related with the main activity 
carried out, since each type of bank is expected to 
manage its liquidity in order to meet it targets. Thus, 
DeYoung and Jang (2016) found that banks that have more 
branches generate more deposits, and banks that invest 
in housing finance use their deposits to fund their long-
term investments, represented by residential mortgages. 
As these activities are typical of banks with a commercial 
portfolio, based on the findings of DeYoung and Jang 
(2016), the following hypothesis was formulated:
H13: the level of structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil 
is positively related with their main type of activity.
After the 2008 crisis, the debate about financial 
regulation was renewed. The liquidity of the assets traded 
by banks is the principle of the proposal that resulted 
in Basel III. After the crisis, it was verified that banks’ 
assets did not reflect their own liquidity, but rather 
derivations of the operating conditions of the markets 
(Vasconcelos, 2014).
According to Silva (2009), the rules adopted by 
the CB to adapt the National Financial System to the 
Basel Agreements contributed to bank operations 
assuming a clear operating standard, demonstrating 
more transparency and security. Aita (2010) states that 
the contagion from the international crisis suffered by 
the Brazilian economy reduced market liquidity, which 
required strategic measures by the CB.
In his study of the effects of the global crisis on Brazil, 
Freitas (2009) states that liquidity only started flowing 
again in March of 2009, when the National Monetary 
Council (Conselho Monetário Nacional - CMN), via the 
Credit Guarantee Fund (Fundo Garantidor de Crédito 
- FGC), established special protection and restored 
confidence in the market. For Vasconcelos (2014), this 
situation warrants the conservative requirements of the 
Basel Agreement, using minimum capital as a liquidity 
buffer in extreme conditions; when there is increased 
uncertainty, banks make use of greater liquidity security 
buffers.
Thus, the following hypothesis was formulated, in 
order to analyze the relationship between the structural 
liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil and the Basel 
agreements:
H14: the level of structural liquidity of banking institutions in 
Brazil is positively related with the validity period of the Basel 
III Agreement.
3. METHODOLOGY
To carry out the empirical tests, as well as specifying the model to be used as a reference, an important step 
consists of defining the way to measure the variable of interest, the SLI.
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3.1. Definition of the Proxy for the SLI
Considering that the NSFR is not yet regulated in 
Brazil and that the SLI published in the REF cannot be 
used for this study, as it only presents aggregate data for 
the system and uses information that is unavailable to 
external users – such as settlement and custody system 
data, for example – a proxy was developed for the SLI, 
as summarized in equation 1. 
in which stable resources are composed of total deposits, 
loans, and transfers obtained from other institutions in the 
country (generally development banks and constitutional 
funds) or abroad (head office of foreign institutions 
or multilateral bodies), treasury bills, and obligations 
represented by bonds and securities abroad, and long-
term investments correspond to naturally long-term 
investments, composed of so-called unusual assets (those 
that do not form part of the bank giro system), credit and 
commercial lease operations, and bonds and securities 
classified in accounting as available for sale or kept until 
maturity. These assets are naturally long-term and need 
a stable source of resources.
3.2. Definition of the Model
Having defined the dependent variable, model 2 
was developed to test the research hypotheses and 
the relationship between the structural liquidity of 
Brazilian banking institutions and the macroeconomic, 
characteristic, and regulatory variables. 
in which SLIit is the proxy for the SLI of the i-th financial 
institution in period t, as according to equation 1, GDPt 
is the variation in GDP at market prices in period t, BIt is 
the basic interest rate of the economy – Special System for 
Settlement and Custody (Selic) – deflated by the Consumer 
Price Index (IPCA) in period t, EXCt is the final period 
selling exchange rate deflated by the IPCA in period t, CRt 
is the country-risk measured by the Emerging Markets 
Bond Plus Index (EMBI+) calculated by JP Morgan bank 
in period t, BTt is the ratio of the balance of trade to 
GDP in period t, IRt is the ratio of international reserves 
to GDP in period t, AIt is the American interest rate in 
period t, CDt is the ratio of compulsory deposits to the 
broad monetary base in period t, ROEt is the profitability 
indicator (return on equity) in period t, SIZit is the 
natural logarithm of total assets in period t, GOVit is the 
dichotomous variable that represents the legal nature of 
the bank, taking the value 1 if the financial institution is 
controlled by the government and 0 for other controls, 
TRDit is the dichotomous control variable that indicates 
whether the financial institutions used in the sample are 
publicly traded on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and 
Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa) in 2017 and is 0 for the 
rest, TCBit is the dichotomous control variable that, based 
on the type of consolidated banking informed by the CB, 
indicates whether the financial institutions used in the 
sample have a commercial portfolio in 2017 and is 0 for 
the rest, B3t is the dichotomous variable that represents 
the validity period of the Basel III Agreement, taking 
the value 1 for the periods as of October of 2013 and 0 
for the rest, and uit is the random error of the regression, 
supposedly ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2).
Considering the research hypotheses and model 2, the 
relationships between the independent variables and the 
structural liquidity of the banks that operate in Brazil are 
expected to be statistically significant and the sign of the 
coefficients of each of them is expected to observe the 
relationship presented in Table 1.
Table 1 
Relationship between hypotheses, independent variables, and expected sign for the regression parameters
Hypotheses H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H11 H12 H13 H14
Variables GDP BI EXC CR BT IR AI CD ROE SIZ GOV TRD TCB B3
Expected sign - - + - - + - + - - + + + +
B3 = dummy variable, which is 1 in the validity period of Basel III and 0 in the rest; BT = ratio of the balance of trade to gross 
domestic product (GDP); EXC = exchange rate variation; CD = ratio of compulsory deposits to the broad monetary base; AI = 
American interest rate; TRD = dummy variable, taking 1 for a financial institution publicly traded on the stock exchange or 0 
otherwise; GDP = variation in GDP; GOV = dummy variable, taking 1 if the financial institution is controlled by the government 
and 0 otherwise; IR = ratio of international reserves to GDP; ROE = profitability indicator (return on equity); CR = country-risk 
measured by the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+); SIZ = natural logarithm of total assets; TCB = dummy variable, 
taking 1 for a financial institution with a commercial portfolio and 0 otherwise; SIZ = natural logarithm of total assets. 
- = negative; + = positive.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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The natural statistical technique to test the research 
hypotheses was the multiple regression with panel data, 
given the widespread availability of data related to a large 
number of banking institutions during a time period 
considered to be long and significant.
3.3. Sample
To carry out the empirical tests, the macroeconomic 
data series and the monthly accounting information were 
considered for a sample of 184 financial conglomerates or 
individual institutions not forming part of conglomerates, 
in the period from June 2002 to December 2014 (151 
months), resulting in T x N = 3,312 observations.
The definition of the start of the period studied (June 
2002) is warranted by the start of the validity period of the 
accounting rules that address the accounting classification 
of bonds and securities for trading, available for sale, or 
kept until maturity. Institutions that did not have the 
information needed to determine the proxy for the SLI 
were also excluded from the sample.
The data for the variables SLI, BI, BT, IR, CD, ROE, 
SIZ, GOV, and TCB were collected from the web pages 
of the CB. The data for the GDP variable were taken 
from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE) and the EXC and CR variables were taken from 
the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was the source of the 
AI variable and the B3 variable applied as of the date the 
Basel III Agreement was published. The TRD variable 
combined information from the CB with information 
from the BM&FBovespa.
4. RESULTS ANALYSIS
The calculation of the descriptive statistics shows 
that the values of the central tendency measures (mean, 
median) are approximate for most of the variables, 
characterizing a normal distribution of data, which 
although asymmetric have no accentuated deviations, 
and is confirmed by the kurtosis, which presents values 
greater than 0.263, indicating platykurtic curves (heavy 
tails) for the variables, as can be verified in Table 2.
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the non-dichotomous variables
SLI GDP BI EXC CR BT IR AI CD ROE SIZ
Mean 1.21 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.02 1.32 0.00 0.08 0.02 8.52
Median 0.95 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.02 1.37 0.00 0.07 0.02 8.55
Maximum 9.96 0.03 0.02 0.28 2.40 0.08 1.95 0.00 0.14 1.47 15.90
Minimum 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.61 0.00 0.03 -23.35 0.21
1st quartile 0.72 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.20 0.01 0.97 0.00 0.06 0.00 10.32
3rd quartile 1.28 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.42 0.04 1.69 0.00 0.10 0.05 12.83
Standard deviation 1.23 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.40 0.02 0.39 0.00 0.03 0.34 2.61
Asymmetry 3.62 -0.30 -0.07 1.65 3.02 0.30 -0.04 1.02 0.50 -56.36 0.18
Kurtosis 19.21 2.55 5.72 9.00 12.75 2.30 1.70 2.60 2.56 3.57 3.20
BT = ratio of the balance of trade to gross domestic product (GDP); EXC = exchange rate variation; CD = ratio of compulsory 
deposits to the broad monetary base; SLI = proxy for the structural liquidity index as according to equation 1; AI = American 
interest rate; GDP = variation in GDP; IR = proportion of international reserves over GDP; ROE = profitability indicator (return 
on equity); CR = country-risk measured by the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+); SIZ = natural logarithm of total 
assets; BI = basic interest rate of the economy.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
So that it is clearer to the reader, Table 3 shows the evolution of the macroeconomic variables in 12 months.
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Table 3 
Evolution of the macroeconomic variables
GDP BI EXC CR BT IR AI CD
2002 3.05% 23.03% 3.46% 14.46% 2.96% 0.86% 1.24% 4.25%
2003 1.14% 16.91% 2.87% 4.63% 4.33% 1.00% 0.98% 6.59%
2004 5.76% 17.50% 2.63% 3.82% 5.02% 0.91% 2.16% 6.39%
2005 3.20% 18.24% 2.33% 3.11% 4.93% 0.79% 4.16% 6.43%
2006 3.96% 13.19% 2.13% 1.92% 4.18% 0.74% 5.24% 6.12%
2007 6.07% 11.18% 1.76% 2.21% 2.84% 1.22% 4.24% 6.02%
2008 5.09% 13.66% 2.33% 4.28% 1.44% 1.36% 0.16% 6.07%
2009 -0.13% 8.65% 1.73% 1.92% 1.50% 1.52% 0.12% 3.11%
2010 7.53% 10.66% 1.66% 1.89% 0.90% 1.42% 0.18% 9.17%
2011 3.97% 10.90% 1.87% 2.08% 1.13% 1.52% 0.07% 13.75%
2012 1.92% 7.16% 2.03% 1.42% 0.81% 1.81% 0.16% 11.11%
2013 3.00% 9.90% 2.32% 2.24% 0.13% 1.79% 0.09% 9.70%
2014 0.50% 11.58% 2.64% 2.59% -0.19% 1.82% 0.12% 9.79%
BT = ratio of the balance of trade to gross domestic product (GDP) in 12 months; EXC = annual real exchange rate variation; 
CD = ratio of compulsory deposits to the broad monetary base in 12 months; AI = annual effective American interest rate; 
GDP = variation in GDP at market prices in 1 year; IR = ratio of international reserves, net concept, to GDP in 12 months; CR = 
country-risk measured by the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) at the end of the period; BI = basic interest rate of the 
economy (p.a.). 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Prior to estimating model 2, procedures were adopted 
to verify whether the conditions that ensured robust 
results were met. The multicollinearity risk was assessed 
using the correlation matrix between the explanatory 
variables of the model.
Considering the rule suggested by Gujarati and Porter 
(2011), that there is a relevant risk of multicollinearity 
when the correlation reaches the threshold of 0.8, the 
results show that the BT and IR variables should not be 
tested together, but in separate models.
A more robust investigation of the multicollinearity 
problem is carried out via an analysis of the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). The VIF of an independent 
variable is obtained via VIFk = (1- R²k)-1, in which VIFk 
is the VIF of the k-th independent variable and R²k is 
the coefficient of determination of the regression of 
the k-th independent variable in relation to the other 
independent variables. The literature indicates that 
VIFs greater than 4 warrant deeper investigation, while 
VIFs greater than 10 indicate serious multicollinearity 
problems. Given the result of the correlation matrix, the 
decision was taken to analyze the VIFs of the explanatory 
variables of the proposed models, whose result is in 
Table 4.
The VIF analysis shows a value greater than 4 for the 
IR variable and close to 4 for the BT variable, reinforcing 
the decision that these variables should not be tested 
together, but in separate regressions.
Table 4
Variance inflation factors of the non-dichotomous explanatory variables
Variable GDP BI EXC CR BT IR AI CD ROE SIZ
R2 0.339 0.477 0.205 0.464 0.727 0.835 0.590 0.341 0.006 0.005
VIF 1.514 1.911 1.258 1.867 3.665 6.050 2.441 1.516 1.006 1.005
BT = ratio of the balance of trade to gross domestic product (GDP); EXC = exchange rate variation; CD = ratio of compulsory 
deposits to the broad monetary base; VIF = variance inflation factor ; AI = American interest rate; GDP = variation in GDP; IR 
= ratio of international reserves to GDP; ROE = profitability indicator (return on equity); CR = country-risk measured by the 
Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+); SIZ = natural logarithm of total assets; BI = basic interest rate of the economy.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The verification of the presence of unit roots was carried 
out using the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS), ADF-Fisher, 
and PP-Fisher tests in all the series. The results reveal that, 
with the exception of the IR variable, all the variables are 
stationary according to the IPS and ADF-Fisher tests. 
The AI variable is stationary in the IPS and ADF-Fisher 
tests, and not stationary only in the PP-Fischer test. The 
IR variable is not stationary in the three tests used. This, 
however, does not compromise the robustness of the 
regressions, given that there is no spurious regression 
Factors associated with the structural liquidity of banks in Brazil
262 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo
when only one of the variables included in the regression 
is not stationary (Noriega & Ventosa-Santaularia, 2007).
4.1. Analysis of the Determinants of Bank 
Structural Liquidity
To test the statistical significance of the explanatory 
variables for the structural liquidity of the banks that 
operate in Brazil, represented by the SLI, two estimations 
of model 2 were carried out, alternately and separately 
using the BT and IR variables, due to the multicollinearity 
risk highlighted in the previous section.
In general, the panel regression estimations can be 
carried out using three methods: pooled regression, fixed 
effects, and random effects. As is customary, first the 
redundant fixed effects test was used (in order to test the 
null hypothesis that the fixed effects are redundant against 
the alternative hypothesis of significant fixed effects), 
which would mean that the pooled regression would be 
appropriate. In the test carried out, the null hypothesis 
that the cross-sectional fixed effects are redundant 
was strongly rejected, both in the F version and in the 
likelihood function version (χ2) of the test, indicating 
the choice of the fixed effects regression. Despite this 
result, the decision was made to present, in the regression 
results, the result of the pooled regressions, for comparison 
purposes. The result of the redundant fixed effects test is 
shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Redundant fixed effects tests
Estimation I  Estimation II
Tests Statistic g.l. p-value Statistic g.l. p-value
F cross-section 134.982 -181.192 0.000 134.937 -181.192 0.000
Chi-squared cross-section 15,923.488 181.000 0.000 15,919.902 181.000 0.000
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Next, an attempt was made to apply the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test to support the decision regarding the fixed 
effects versus random effects estimation (Nakamura & 
Nakamura, 1981). Unfortunately, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
statistic cannot be calculated, since the assumptions 
associated with this statistic are not compatible with 
choosing an estimation of robust standard errors in regards 
to heteroskedasticity using the White variance-covariance 
matrix used to control heteroskedasticity, as described 
below. However, for comparison purposes, the regression 
was estimated with random effects, having produced an R2 
of only 0.0140, against an R2 of 0.5701 from the estimation 
with fixed effects, revealing that the latter fit the data much 
better. In light of these results, the decision was made to 
keep the estimation with cross-sectional fixed effects, with 
robust standard errors.
There are still two additional problems in this 
estimation. The ROE variable is one of the regressors in 
the model, contributing to explaining the SLI. However, 
the SLI, in turn, surely contributes to explaining ROE. 
This situation of simultaneity results in ROE being an 
endogenous variable, thus being correlated with the 
residuals of the regression, and therefore causing biased 
and inconsistent coefficients. One solution to this problem 
is to use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation or 
the generalized method of moments (GMM). In this study, 
2SLS was chosen, which estimates biased, but consistent 
coefficients, which is guaranteed in this study, given the 
sample size, with 3,312 observations.
The other problem is the inevitability of 
heteroskedasticity of the residuals occurring, given the 
variability of the sample, which would produce inefficient 
standard errors, leading to probable type II inferential 
errors. To control this probable heteroskedasticity, the 
option of the White variance-covariance matrix was used 
to produce robust standard errors in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.
Therefore, four estimations were carried out: two with 
pooled regression using 2SLS, with estimation of robust 
standard errors and alternating the BT and IR variables, 
and another two with cross-sectional fixed effects using 
2SLS, with robust standard errors, also alternating the 
same variables, in order to avoid multicollinearity.
The results are consolidated in Table 6. Hypothesis H1 
assumes a negative relationship between the structural 
liquidity of the banking institutions and the level of 
economic activity (GDP) of the country. The results of the 
estimations in both models do not confirm the hypothesis 
constructed based on the results of Aspachs et al. (2005), 
Vodova (2011a), and Vinhado and Belém (2013). One 
possibility for this result is that the literature used as a 
reference considered short-term liquidity and that the 
long-term relationship undergoes different effects from the 
level of economic activity. The empirical evidence suggests 
that banks can bring forward or make gradual adjustments 
in their structure of investments and long-term resources, 
depending on the level of economic activity, which is not 
captured in the model.
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Table 6
Results of the estimation of model 1 to identify the determinants of structural liquidity
Model tested:
SLIit = β0 + β1GDPt + β2BIt + β3EXCt + β4CRt + β5BTt + β6IRt + β7AIt + β8CDt + β9ROEit + β10SIZit + β11GOVit + β12TRDit + β13TCBit + β14B3it + uit
Instruments for 2SLS:
C, GDP, GDP(-1), BI, BI(-1), EXC, EXC(-1), CR, CR(-1), ROE(-1), GOV, SIZ, BT, AI, CD, IR, TRD, B3, TCB
Dep. 
Var.
Pooled Fixed Effects
Estimation I (BC) Estimation II (RI) Estimation I (BC) Estimation II (RI)
Coef. p-value Sig. Coef. p-value Sig. Coef. p-value Sig. Coef. p-value Sig.
C 0.587 0.000 *** 0.491 0.000 *** 1.056 0.000 *** 0.910 0.000 ***
GDP 0.853 0.212 1.213 0.100 0.158 0.809 0.733 0.301
BI -3.214 0.029 ** -3.994 0.007 *** -3.069 0.021 ** -3.224 0.016 **
EXC 0.258 0.017 ** 0.373 0.000 *** 0.299 0.005 *** 0.415 0.000 ***
CR -0.161 0.000 *** -0.180 0.000 *** -0.196 0.000 *** -0.209 0.000 ***
BT -1.647 0.000 *** -1.805 0.000 ***
IR 0.052 0.071 * 0.078 0.001 ***
AI -3.260 0.473 -5.594 0.286 6.515 0.104 6.420 0.148
CD 0.809 0.000 *** 0.789 0.000 *** 0.520 0.008 *** 0.477 0.019 **
ROE 0.083 0.000 *** 0.084 0.000 *** 0.027 0.008 *** 0.028 0.008 ***
SIZ 0.082 0.000 *** 0.082 0.000 *** 0.030 0.004 *** 0.030 0.003 ***
GOV -0.258 0.000 *** -0.258 0.000 ***
TRD -0.231 0.000 *** -0.231 0.000 ***
TCB 0.063 0.000 *** 0.062 0.000 ***
B3 -0.038 0.064 * -0.030 0.160 -0.065 0.001 * -0.059 0.003 ***
B3 = dummy variable, taking 1 in the validity period of Basel III and 0 in the rest; BT = ratio of the balance of trade to gross 
domestic product (GDP); EXC = exchange rate variation; CD = ratio of compulsory deposits to the broad monetary base; SLI = 
proxy for the structural liquidity index as according to equation 1; AI = American interest rate; TRD = dummy variable, taking 1 
for a financial institution publicly traded on the stock exchange or 0 otherwise; GDP = variation in GDP; GOV = dummy variable, 
taking 1 for a financial institution controlled by the government and 0 otherwise; IR = ratio of international reserves to GDP; ROE 
= profitability indicator (return on equity); CR = country risk measured by the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+); SIZ 
= natural logarithm of total assets; TCB = dummy variable, taking 1 for a financial institution with a commercial portfolio or 0 
otherwise; BI = basic interest rate of the economy. 
***, **, * = level of significance of the parameters at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The negative relationship expected between structural 
liquidity and the level of the basic interest rate (BI) was 
confirmed in both models, corroborating hypothesis 
H2. This evidence confirms and reinforces the results of 
Oreiro (2005) and Vinhado and Belém (2013), in which 
it can be found that an increase in the interest rate of 
public debt will lead a bank to increase the interest rate 
on its investments, discouraging borrowers of long-term 
loans, as well as incentivizing the flow of resources into 
short-term operations, in order to take advantage of gains 
derived from the increase in interest rates. 
In the third hypothesis, the relationship between 
bank structural liquidity and exchange rate variations 
(EXC) was tested. The tests with both estimations showed 
that there was a positive and significant relationship 
between the variables, confirming H3. These results 
may be associated with the difficulty found by banking 
institutions in timely anticipating the effects of exchange 
rate variations. In addition, the study by Primo et al. 
(2013) on profitability (which has a negative relationship 
with liquidity) corroborates the results of this research.
The country-risk (CR) effect on structural liquidity was 
the relationship tested by H4. The results of both estimations 
show a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between the variables, confirming the research hypothesis 
and converging with the evidence of Resende and Amado 
(2007) and Manhiça and Jorge (2012), who stated that an 
aversion to country-risk would cause an outflow of foreign 
resources from Brazil towards countries that are considered 
to be safer. This demonstrates that an increase in country-
risk, because it is a reflection of diminished confidence in 
relation to the domestic economy, more strongly affects 
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stable resources than long-term investments, causing a 
negative effect on the structural liquidity of banks.
The relationship between structural liquidity and the 
balance of trade (BT) was the fifth hypothesis tested. The 
results of estimation I confirm the negative and statistically 
significant relationship, corroborating H5. This empirical 
evidence demonstrates that when the balance of trade 
improves, directly influencing the balance of current 
transactions, there is a favorable impact over the economy, 
since exports bring more resources into Brazil, which 
should translate into more investments – requiring more 
long-term bank credit, increasing the denominator of 
the SLI formula and, consequently, reducing the index.
In relation to international reserves (IR), the results 
of estimation II converge with the study by Resende 
and Amado (2007), according to which growth in the 
international reserves of peripheral countries is explained 
by periods of expansion in the supply of international 
liquidity and by the absorption by these economies of 
the possibilities of access to international financing. In 
summary, the empirical tests confirm the positive and 
statistically significant relationship between international 
reserves and the structural liquidity of Brazilian banks, 
thus corroborating hypothesis H6.
The relationship between interest rate changes in the 
United States and the structural liquidity of Brazilian 
banks is the seventh hypothesis tested. Based on the 
literature on current, short-term liquidity, a negative 
relationship was predicted between the American interest 
rate (AI) and the SLI in Brazil, which was confirmed 
in the pooled regression model, although it was not 
statistically significant. The results of the two estimations 
in the regression with fixed effects, however, showed 
positive signs and no statistical significance, leading 
to the rejection of H7. It is possible to understand this 
positive relationship found based on the assumption 
that interest rates in the United States negatively affect 
short-term liquidity in Brazil, but, as they do not involve 
diminished confidence in the domestic economy, they can 
end up positively affecting structural liquidity, through a 
reduction in the banks’ long-term investments.
The relationship between the level of compulsory 
deposits (CD) and structural liquidity is the eighth 
research hypothesis tested. Confirming expectations, 
the empirical tests demonstrated a positive relationship 
with statistical significance between the variables, 
corroborating H8. Thus, it is understood that an increase 
in the level of banks’ compulsory deposits positively affects 
structural liquidity, reducing the volume of resources 
directed at the institutions’ long-term investments, which 
is consistent with the findings of Dantas et al. (2011), 
while the numerator of the SLI is not affected – the result 
is an increase in the value of the indicator.
The ninth research hypothesis of this study relates the 
level of profitability of each banking institution in Brazil 
with its structural liquidity. The negative relationship 
expected was not confirmed, which leads to the rejection of 
H9. The results demonstrated the positive and statistically 
significant association at 1% between return and structural 
liquidity in the estimations of both models, which suggests 
the possible arbitration of profits, as was already pointed 
out by King (2013) and DeYoung and Jang (2016), since 
in order to meet the NSFR standards, banks may be 
incentivized to reduce high-performance assets and 
increase stable resources, which has a positive effect on 
returns. The positive relationship indicates synchronicity 
between liquidity management and the profitability of 
Brazilian banks and corroborates the findings of DeYoung 
and Jang (2016) in the United States.
For large banks, the imposition of standards linked 
to the NSFR could have big and systematic effects on the 
supply of credit via the banking, political, and economic 
supervisors, if structural liquidity levels were below the 
minimum required in Basel III. The negative relationship 
between the size of the institution and bank structural 
liquidity was tested and rejected in H10, which leads to 
the understanding that the banks (independently of their 
size) have substantially increased their absolute liquidity 
levels, as well as reorganizing their balance sheet liquidity 
risk management practices.
H11 tested the possibility that Brazilian government 
banks would have a greater preference for liquidity in 
relation to private ones, in accordance with the study 
by Vinhado and Belém (2013), and the results reveal a 
negative, statistically significant relationship at 1% and 
indicate that both government and private banks are able 
to irrigate the economy with liquidity by granting credit. 
The signs in the pooled regression model are confirmed 
again and reveal a negative and statistically significant 
relationship, which leads to the rejection of H11.
Given the results found by DeYoung and Jang (2016), 
H12 expected a positive relationship between bank liquidity 
and having shares publicly traded on the stock exchange. 
The basis was that the stock market would be an external 
source of liquidity for banks, with greater relevance than 
the debt markets. However, H12 was not proven and a 
negative relationship was found in Brazil. The reason for 
this finding needs investigation, but it may be an indication 
of the fact that Brazil has relatively few institutions with 
publicly traded shares (only 12%, or 22 of the 184 in the 
sample), revealing that this is not the most important 
source of liquidity for the banks.
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The type of activity carried out by the bank was expected 
to present a relationship with structural liquidity, which 
was investigated by H13. In this case, the hypothesis that 
banks with a commercial portfolio have a higher structural 
liquidity indicator was confirmed. The results indicate that 
this type of bank, due to its characteristics, can fund its 
long-term investments via its deposits, thus converging with 
the results of DeYoung and Jang (2016), who investigated 
this behavior through the value of mortgages (long-term 
investments) and number of (retail) branches.
Finally, the last hypothesis, H14, aims to verify whether 
the validity period of the Basel III Agreement had any 
relationship with the level of structural liquidity of the 
banks. A positive sign was expected, but the tests returned 
a negative and statistically significant sign, which generates 
inconclusive results. Possibly, another phenomenon may 
be dominating the effect of B3. This counter-intuitive 
result might suggest that, since the validity period (starting 
in October 2013) coincides with the start of a political and 
economic crisis in the country, this may have contaminated 
the variable of interest, since, as Krishnamurthy et al. 
(2016) state, bank liquidity performs an important role 
during financial crises. Thus, the study might not have 
captured the relationship with the Basel III Agreement, 
but rather the one between the Brazilian crisis and the 
liquidity of the banks, which occurred simultaneously and 
was not the object of this study. At any rate, hypothesis 
H14 was not confirmed.
5. CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to identify the relationship 
between the structural liquidity of the banking institutions 
that operate in Brazil and macroeconomic variables, 
bank characteristic variables, and the banks’ sensitivity 
to the implementation of the Basel III Agreement. For 
this, monthly accounting data was used for 184 financial 
conglomerates or individual institutions between the 
months of June 2002 and December 2014.
To determine the dependent variable representative 
of the SLI of the banking institutions, a proxy for the 
indicator used by the CB was used, formed by means of 
the ratio between long-term investments and stable capital. 
In addition, 14 research hypotheses were constructed 
that were the basis for the definition of the econometric 
model and the results analysis, and which set out the 
expected relationships between the level of structural 
liquidity of the institutions that operate in Brazil and the 
chosen variables. 
The results, calculated with the use of pooled and 
fixed effects panel data regressions, demonstrated in 
Table 6, support the research hypotheses that the level 
of structural liquidity of banking institutions in Brazil 
has a statistically significant relationship in the expected 
direction, this being: (i) negative for positive variations 
in the interest rates, revealing that Brazilian banks reduce 
their long-term liquidity when interest rates rise (H2); (ii) 
positive with positive variations in the exchange rates, 
confirming the assumption that the banks are unable to 
adequately anticipate variations in the currency market 
(H3); (iii) negative with the Brazil-risk, showing the impact 
that diminished confidence in the domestic economy 
causes in terms of an outflow of investor resources and 
affecting structural liquidity (H4); (iv) negative with 
the balance of trade, given that the balance of foreign 
transactions contributes to an increase in long-term 
investments, negatively affecting structural liquidity (H5); 
(v) positive with international reserves, which have a 
negative relationship with the balance of trade, so that 
they tend to positively affect structural liquidity (H6); (vi) 
positive with compulsory deposits, explaining that the 
level of structural liquidity increases when the level of 
compulsory deposits is raised by the inhibitor effect that 
they have over long-term investments (H8); a significant 
relationship in the opposite direction was found, this 
being (vii) positive with returns, indicating the effective 
management of liquidity and returns of the banks in 
Brazil (H9); (viii) positive with size, which reveals that 
the Brazilian banking institutions did not reduce their 
liquidity targets in the period analyzed; (ix) negative with 
government control and banks publicly traded on the 
BM&FBovespa and positive with banks with a commercial 
portfolio, indicating a significant association between this 
type of institution and structural liquidity; (x) negative 
with the validity period of the Basel III Agreement, despite 
a positive relationship being expected, leading it to be 
believed that the study captured the effect of another 
phenomenon that was not investigated, which may have 
some relationship with the political and economic crisis 
in the country, which started in the period studied, 
and not with the regulatory variable itself. Finally, no 
relevant statistical relationship was found between the 
level of structural liquidity of the banking institutions 
and economic activity represented by GDP (H1) and the 
American interest rates (H7).
Standing out as limitations is the start of the validity 
period of the accounting standards that address the 
accounting classification of bonds and securities for 
trading, available for sale, and kept until maturity as of 2002, 
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which limited the number of observations. In addition, the 
concept of structural liquidity, represented in this study 
by the SLI indicator as a proxy for the one developed and 
used managerially by the CB, which is equivalent to the 
NSFR with recommended implementation as of 2018, as 
according to the Basel III Agreement, is relatively new and 
may not yet have been employed in other economic or 
crisis settings, which would make comparing the results 
found in the Brazilian case difficult. 
However, as the research captured a statistically 
significant relationship between this period and bank 
liquidity, this may be associated not with the Basel 
agreement, but with another phenomenon that was 
not evaluated, suggesting a possible relationship with 
the deterioration in the economic fundamentals of the 
Brazilian economy, the beginning of which coincided with 
the validity period of that agreement. Thus, for future 
studies, we suggest deepening the research on the effect 
of the Brazilian economic crisis, which appears to be 
significant from 2013 onward, over the structural liquidity 
of the banks and other variables. In addition, we suggest an 
analysis of the relationships between the macroeconomic 
and regulatory variables and the level of bank structural 
liquidity, if possible, in other economies, such as that of 
the United States, in order to prove the results found, since, 
as DeYoung and Jang (2016) state, liquidity and lending 
indices are practiced by many banks in the country as a 
way of diagnosing liquidity risks.
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